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O P I N I O N* 
   
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Reneisha Knight appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of her Second 
Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act (“FDCPA”).  Knight’s FDCPA claim arises from the receipt of a debt collection 
letter from Midland Credit Management, Inc. (“Midland”), which Knight claims is false, 
deceptive, and misleading.  Upon Midland’s motion to dismiss, the District Court 
concluded that the letter could not constitute a violation of the FDCPA and granted 
dismissal.  For the reasons that follow, we will reverse the District Court’s order granting 
Midland’s motion to dismiss and will remand with instructions to deny the motion. 
 I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
Knight had $944.08 of personal credit card debt that was originally owed to 
Capital One Bank, N.A. and later purchased by Midland Funding, LLC.1  A. 32.  Midland 
sent Knight a letter (the “Letter”) in an attempt to collect on this debt.  A. 32.  The 
Letter’s top half includes, among other things, the name of the “Original Creditor,” the 
“Original Account” number, and the name of the debt’s “Current Owner.”  A. 32.  A few 
                                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 Midland Funding LLC, the current owner of Knight’s debt, is a separate corporate entity 
from Midland Credit Management, Inc., the entity which attempted to collect on Knight’s 
debt and which is the appellee in this case.  A. 32. 
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lines below this, the Letter states, “We can’t change the past, but we can help with your 
future.”  Id. 
The section of the Letter immediately following this statement is divided into two 
columns.  A. 32.  The right-hand column is titled “KNOW YOUR OPTIONS” and 
provides three loan repayment options.  Id.  Option 1 offers “40% OFF” if payment is 
made by a specified date, Option 2 provides for “20% OFF” if the debt is paid over the 
course of six months, and Option 3 offers “Monthly Payments As Low As: $50 per 
month.”  Id.   
The lower section’s left-hand column states that “Midland Credit Management 
believes that everyone deserves a second chance” and invites Knight “to accept one of 
these discounts.”  Id.  Several lines later, the Letter then explains, “After receiving your 
final payment, we will consider the account paid*.”  Id.  This references a note at the 
bottom of the Letter, which provides, “*If you pay your full balance, we will report your 
account as Paid in Full.  If you pay less than your full balance, we will report your 
account as Paid in Full for less than the full balance.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  
B. Procedural History 
Knight filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that the Letter violates 
Section 1692e of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et. seq., because it is false, deceptive, 
and misleading.  A. 21.  Knight later filed a First Amended Complaint, which Midland 
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  A. 3.  The District Court granted Midland’s 
motion, dismissing the complaint without prejudice and allowing Knight to file a Second 
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Amended Complaint.  A. 3.  Knight did so, and Midland responded by filing a second 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  A. 4.  
On November 8, 2017, the District Court granted Midland’s motion without 
prejudice, concluding that Knight’s “stated challenge of the debt collection language is, 
as a matter of law, not confusing or misleading to the least sophisticated debtor.”  A. 16.  
The District Court gave Knight until November 22, 2017 to amend her complaint. A. 4.  
Knight did not file a Third Amended Complaint, and on November 27, 2017, the District 
Court entered an order closing the case. A. 4.  Knight filed a notice of appeal on 
December 20, 2017. A. 4. 
II. DISCUSSION2 
 On appeal, Knight argues that the District Court erred in granting Midland’s 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  In response, Midland argues, first, that we 
lack jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and Rule 4 of the Federal Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and, second, that the District Court did not err in granting the 
motion to dismiss.  For the following reasons, we disagree with both of Midland’s 
arguments and find that we have jurisdiction and that the District Court erred in 
dismissing Knight’s complaint. 
                                                            
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  As discussed below, we 
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise de novo 
review over a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  Wilson v. 
Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000).  We “must consider only the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as 
undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these 
documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  We accept all factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 931 (3d Cir. 2010). 




 Midland argues that we lack jurisdiction because Knight’s appeal is untimely 
under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Appellee’s Br. at 1.  Pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over appeals of district courts’ final decisions.  
Rule 4 requires that a notice of appeal be filed “within 30 days after entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from.”  Fed. R. App. P. 4.  According to Midland, the District 
Court’s November 8, 2017 Order was “a dismissal of the case” and, therefore, the final 
order upon which this appeal is based.  Appellee’s Br. at 1 (emphasis in original).  
Because Knight did not file her notice of appeal within 30 days of this order, Midland 
argues that her appeal is untimely.  Appellee’s Br. at 2. 
 Midland’s argument is without merit.  “Generally, an order which dismisses a 
complaint without prejudice is neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be 
corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the cause of action.”  Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1976).  However, where the plaintiff fails to 
amend the complaint, the order of dismissal becomes final and appealable once the 
amendment period passes because the plaintiff has chosen to stand on the complaint.  See 
Batoff v. State Farms Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Welch v. Folsom, 
925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1991).   Because Knight did not amend her complaint a third 
time, the November 8, 2017 Order dismissing her complaint was not “final” until 
November 22, 2017, when the District Court ended the opportunity to amend by closing 
the case.  Because Knight filed her notice of appeal within 30 days of November 22, 
2017, her appeal is timely. 
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B. Motion to Dismiss 
 Knight argues the District Court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, the Letter 
was not deceptive or misleading in violation of the FDCPA.  Appellant’s Br. at 11.  
Section 1692e of the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, 
or misleading representation in connection with the collection of any debt,” including 
“[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect 
any debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).  
Courts analyze FDCPA claims under the “least sophisticated debtor” standard.  
Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2015).  This standard is “lower 
than simply examining whether particular language would deceive or mislead a 
reasonable debtor.”  Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 
149 (3d Cir. 2013).  It protects “the gullible as well as the shrewd.”  Id.   Nevertheless, 
the least sophisticated debtor is held to “a quotient of reasonableness, a basic level of 
understanding, and a willingness to read with care.”  Id.  Accordingly, a debt collector 
cannot be held liable for a plaintiff’s “bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations.”  Id. 
A “specific plaintiff need not prove that she was actually confused or misled.”  
Jensen, 791 F.3d at 419 (emphasis in original).  Instead, the focus is on whether the 
objective least sophisticated debtor would be deceived or misled by a debt collector’s 
statement in a communication.  Id. at 419–20.  “[A] collection letter is deceptive when it 
can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is 
inaccurate.”  Caprio, 709 F.3d at 149 (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
Furthermore, for a debt collector’s statement to be actionable, it must be material.  
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Jensen, 791 F.3d at 421.  A statement is material if it has “the potential to affect the 
decision-making process of the least sophisticated debtor.”  Id.  This, though, “is not a 
particularly high bar.”  Id.  
 On appeal, Knight argues that the Letter could be found to be false, deceptive, and 
misleading in four ways.  We consider each separately below. 
 1. Promise of Financial Benefit 
 First, Knight claims that the Letter implies false and deceptive promises of future 
financial benefit to the consumer.  A. 26.  Knight’s allegation refers to the Letter’s 
statement, “We can’t change the past, but we can help with your future.”  A. 26.  
Knight’s complaint alleges that there are two interpretations of this statement: (1) 
reporting the payment to the credit reporting agencies will improve the debtor’s credit 
score or credit worthiness; or (2) reporting payment to the original creditor will help the 
debtor in future lending decisions.3  A. 26.  Knight contends that the first interpretation is 
false, as paying off a delinquent debt would actually harm the debtor’s credit score.  A. 
26–27. 
 It is not “bizarre or idiosyncratic” for the least sophisticated debtor to read the 
language Knight identifies to mean that payment would not hurt a debtor’s credit score 
and might even actually improve it.  We recognize that this might not be the most 
appropriate reading of the Letter, but it is not our responsibility to determine whether one 
                                                            
3 On appeal, Knight also provides two additional interpretations that were offered by 
Midland and the District Court in the proceedings below. Appellant’s Br. at 13–14.  
However, we must only consider the interpretations alleged in Knight’s complaint.  
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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interpretation is more appropriate than another.  Caprio, 709 F.3d at 151.  Instead, 
analyzing the Letter as we must under the least sophisticated debtor standard, which 
protects “naïve and even gullible individuals,” id., we cannot conclude at this stage that 
the least sophisticated debtor could not have been misled by this language.  Moreover, a 
debtor who falsely believes that making payment on her debt would not hurt her credit 
score and might improve it could be induced to make the payment.  Therefore, this 
language could be found to be material.  
2. To Whom Payments Will Be Reported 
Second, Knight claims that the Letter could be found to be false, deceptive, and 
misleading in its use of the term “report.” A. 22–23.  Knight argues that “report” could be 
reasonably interpreted by the least sophisticated debtor to mean Midland would report the 
payment to the credit reporting agencies, the original creditor, or both. A. 22–23.  
 Knight’s interpretation of the Letter’s use of the term “report” is not “bizarre or 
idiosyncratic.”  Without any other defining or clarifying language as to whom Midland 
will report a debtor’s payment, the least sophisticated debtor could reasonably believe 
that Midland would report the payment to the debtor’s original creditor, the credit 
reporting agencies, or both.  This claim is bolstered by the Letter’s prominent provision 
of the name of Knight’s original creditor.  Because the least sophisticated debtor could 
come to multiple conclusions as to whom the payment is reported that are neither bizarre 
nor idiosyncratic, the Letter could be found to be misleading.  Furthermore, because the 
entity to whom payment is reported can impact a debtor’s decision to pay, this language 
could be found to be material.   
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3. When Payments Will Be Reported as “Paid in Full” versus “Paid in Full for less 
than the full balance” 
 
 Third, Knight argues that the Letter is ambiguous as to when a debtor’s payment 
would be reported as “Paid in Full” or “Paid in Full for less than the full balance.”  A. 23. 
(emphasis omitted).  This argument arises largely from Knight’s assertion that “Option 3” 
of the Letter, which offers monthly payments as low as $50 a month, is ambiguous. A. 
23–25.  Although Option 3 in isolation appears to provide for payment of the full account 
balance, the Letter’s invitation to “accept one of these discounts” suggests that it is 
instead a settlement option.  A. 32 (emphasis added).  Given this ambiguity, Knight 
argues that the Letter could be interpreted by the least sophisticated debtor in several 
ways: (1) “Paid in Full” applies to Option 1 and “Paid in Full for less than the full 
balance” applies if Option 2 or 3 is selected;4 (2) “Paid in Full” applies only if the debtor 
immediately pays the listed “current balance” and choosing any of the three listed options 
results in a report of “Paid in Full for less than the full balance;” (3) “Paid in Full” applies 
to Option 1 or Option 2 and “Paid in Full for less than the full balance” applies to Option 
3; (4) “Paid in Full for less than the full balance” applies to Option 1 or Option 2 and 
“Paid in Full” applies to Option 3; or (5) any partial payment results in the account being 
reported as “Paid in Full for less than the full balance.” A. 23–25. 
                                                            
4 Knight’s complaint alleges two additional variations of this first interpretation: “Paid in 
Full” applies to Option 1 and choosing Option 2 or 3 would result in a reporting that the 
debt is “Paid in Full for less than the full balance” until either (1) final payment of the 
respective discount plan is made or (2) the full account balance is completely paid off. A. 
23–24. 
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 We agree that the Letter could be misleading as to when a debtor’s account will be 
reported as “Paid in Full” or “Paid in Full for less than the full balance.”  The least 
sophisticated debtor is expected to read a communication in its entirety.  Caprio, 709 
F.3d at 149.  Given that the Letter encourages the debtor to accept “one of these 
discounts” and fails to unequivocally state that Option 3 is not a discount but an option to 
pay the full account balance, the least sophisticated debtor reading the entire Letter could 
reasonably understand Option 3 to be a settlement option.  Accordingly, the Letter may 
mislead the least sophisticated debtor with respect to whether “Paid in Full” instead of 
“Paid in Full for less than the full balance” will be reported.  This ambiguity could be 
said to be material because it may affect whether a debtor makes a payment and which 
option he or she chooses. 
4. “Paid in Full” versus “Paid in Full for less than the full balance” 
 Lastly, Knight claims that the Letter’s use of the phrase “Paid in Full for less than 
the full balance” is itself misleading to the least sophisticated debtor. A. 26.  Knight 
alleges that the least sophisticated debtor does not understand the full meaning of this 
reporting status and is unsure how an entity would treat a debt that has been reported as 
“Paid in Full for less than the full balance.” A. 26. 
 We agree that the phrase “Paid in Full for less than the full balance” could be 
found to be misleading.  Both of the reporting statuses provided by the Letter—“Paid in 
Full” and “Paid in Full for less than the full balance”—use the phrase “Paid in Full” with 
the same capitalization, and the latter status has no other capitalized words.  Because any 
payment is reported with the language “Paid in Full,” the ramifications of each status are 
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unclear.  Without any other clarifying language, the least sophisticated debtor may read 
the two statuses together and believe that they have the same reporting consequences and 
that one is no better or worse than the other, which is inaccurate.  Furthermore, this 
language could be found to be material because the least sophisticated debtor may be 
induced to make a specific type of payment based on this information.  
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Midland’s Letter could be found to be 
deceptive and misleading.  Given its ambiguous and contradictory language, the Letter 
could be found to cause the least sophisticated debtor to interpret it in ways that are 
neither bizarre nor idiosyncratic.  Therefore, we will reverse the District Court’s 
dismissal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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